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ENTITY IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
THE FUNCTION OF THE ENTITY IN FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By WILLIAm H. HARRAR*
T HE concepts of trust and corporate entity have had a long life
in federal income taxation and have been especially useful as
weapons to the Treasury in its perennial pursuit" of taxpayers
engaged in the enjoyment of their right 2 to decrease their taxes.
These weapons are double-barrelled. The court may be asked to
hold that the separate legal existence of a corporation as against
its stockholders be upheld and affirmed, as, for instance, where a
taxpayer has been paying the bills of the corporation of which
he is president and wants to deduct the payments from his own
income,3 or on the other hand, it may be urged inexorably to
pierce the corporate veil and to rule that the corporation and its
members, or the trust and its creator, are as One, as for example,
where a grantor of a trust has sought to rid himself of fiscal
burdens on the yield of his property by deeding a portion of it
over to a trustee for the benefit of his wife.4
Last term, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the government in brushing aside the shrouding veils of two
corporations and a trust.5 The decisions are worthy of careful
*Member of the New York Bar; Attorney with the United States
Board of Tax Appeals Despite the author's employment with the Board,
the views herein stated are entirely his own, and not those of the Board
or any of its members.
The author wishes to thank Ralph H. Dwan, Esq., and Henry C.
Stockell, Esq., for their helpful suggestions in the preparation of this
article.
'For an interesting recent exposition of the progress of the engagement,
see Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts, (1940)
53 Harv. L. Rev. 1322.
-Gregory v. Helvering, (1935) 293 U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 79 L.
Ed. 596; Bullen v. Wisconsin, (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60
L. Ed. 830. This right is a chameleon, becoming transformed into a
"wrong" when the taxpayer "gets on the wrong side of the line" and
"evades," rather than "avoids" taxes. See Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax
Avoidance, (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 80.
*Archibald R. Watson, (1940) 42 B. T. A. 52.
4DuPont v. Commissioner, (1933) 289 U. S. 685, 53 Sup. Ct. 766, 77
L. Ed. 1447. Disregard of the trust entity in these circumstances is popu-
larly called the "no-trust" doctrine.
-Griffiths v. Commissioner, (1939) 308 U. S. 355, 60 Sup. Ct. 277,
84 L. Ed. 238; Higgins v. Smith, (1940) 308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355, 84
L. Ed. 321; Helvering v. Clifford, Jr., (1940) 309 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct.
554, 84 L. Ed. 504.
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study, especially as they are now being cited in briefs for every-
thing under the sun and will doubtless result in a flood of ex-
planatory decisions, conflicts of circuits and legal heart-search-
ing similar to that which attended upon Eisner z. Macombcr
and Gregory v. Helvering.
The first case was Griffiths v. Commissioner.7 Griffiths, defraud-
ed on the purchase of certain stock, settled his claim against the
seller by conveying the shares to a corporation created ad hoc
and wholly under Griffiths' control and causing the corporation
to transfer the stock back to the seller for $100,000. The cor-
poration upon receipt of that sum was to pay it over in install-
ments to Griffiths for forty years. The commissioner taxed
Griffiths on the entire amount of the settlement in the year in
which it was made, and the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, upheld his action. The rationale of the decision
lies in this sentence:
"We cannot too often reiterate that 'taxation is not so much
concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual com-
mand over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the
tax is paid.' . . . And it makes no difference that such 'command'
may be exercised through specific retention of legal title or the
creation of a new equitable but controlled interest, or the mainte-
nance of effective benefit through the interposition of a sub-
servient agency."
In other words, the existence of Griffiths' carefully construct-
ed corporation was given no tax effect. What happened was "a
simple sale from Griffiths to Lay and the passage of money from
Lay to Griffiths. That was the crux of the business to Griffiths,
and that is the crux of the business to us."'
Shortly thereafter the Court decided what is fast becoming
6Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed.
521 ; Gregory v. Helvering, (1935) 293 U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed.
596. As of September 1, 1940, the Macomber Case had been cited 293
times by the federal district courts, court of claims and circuit courts of
appeals, according to Shepard's Citations. The Prentice-Hall Citator,
which comprehends not only the federal courts but also the board of tax
appeals, showed approximately 675 citations of this case. The Gregory
Case, more recently decided, is holding its own, Shepard listing 84 citations
and Prentice-Hall approximately 200. An old legend has it that a taxjudge once told his new law secretary: "There are just three rules in this
office. Investigate the facts closely, find them fairly, and don't cite the
Macomber Case."
7(1939) 308 U. S. 355, 60 Sup. Ct. 277, 84 L. Ed. 238.
sThe Griffiths decision is scarcely surprising, although one may ques-
tion whether and how far certain of the aspects of title are merely "refine-
ments." For a recent case following this one, see Paul Plunkett & Co.,
(1940) 42 B. T. A. 464.
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a tax cause clbre,9 Higgins v. Sinith.1 Smith had organized
the Innisfail Corporation in 1926 under the laws of New Jersey.
He owned all of its stock, his subordinates were its officers and
directors, and its transactions, carried on under his direction,
were "restricted largely" to buying securities from, or selling
them to, him. In 1932, he owed Innisfail $70,000, and in partial
payment thereof, he sold the corporation some stock at market,
which had cost him considerably more than market. He was
mindful of tax consequences"' in so doing, and sought to de-
duct his resulting loss in his return for 1932, under sec. 23 (e)
of the Revenue Act of 19 3 2.12
His loss fell under sec. 23 (e) (2), that is, it would have to
be shown to have been incurred in a transaction entered into for
profit, since he was not in the business of buying and selling se-
curities.13 It would further have to be shown that the loss was
sustained in a closed transaction, that is, by a completed, bona
fide sale.'4 Previous to the time at which Higgins v. Smith arose
ORendition of the opinion in Higgins v. Smith led the board of tax
appeals, upon motion of the commissioner, to vacate its decision in John
Thomas Smith, (1939) 40 B. T. A. 387, which had allowed Smith to deduct
losses on sales to his wholly owned corporation in 1929, and to enter an
order disallowing those losses. John Thomas Smith, (1940) 42 B. T. A.
505. Smith's application to the circuit court of appeals, second cir-
cuit, for writs of prohibition and mandamus to restrain the board from
taking action on the commissioner's motion for reconsideration had pre-
viously been denied. In the Matter of the Application of Smith, (C.C.A.,
2nd Cir. April 24, 1940, (1940) PH Par. 62757). The court held that the
board's error in vacating its prior decision, if it were an error, could be
questioned by the usual petition for review, and that the court's jurisdiction
to grant writs of prohibition or mandamus was "limited to the protection of
our own appellate jurisdiction."
10(1940)308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355, 84 L. Ed. 321.
"2Awareness of tax consequences does not damn a taxpayer, but it
wakes up the watchdog. Gregory v. Helvering, (1935) 293 U. S. 465, 55
Sup. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596; Jones v. Helvering, (1934) 63 App. D. C. 204,
71 F. (2d) 214; Rands, Inc., (1936) 34 B. T. A. 1094, appeal dismissed,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 1018; Pacific Grape Products Co.,
(1940) 42 B. T. A. 914.
'
2
"In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"(e) Losses by Individuals.-Subject to the limitations provided in
subsection (r) of this section, in the case of an individual, losses sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise-
"(1) if incurred in trade or business; or
"(2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not
connected with the trade or business...."
""For a collection of cases involving the latter type of loss, see
Marjorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, (1939) 40 B. T. A. 214 (on appeal,
C.C.A. 2nd Cir.). See John Thomas Smith, (1939) 40 B. T. A. 387 for
details of Smith's occupation.
14 See Paul & Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation (1934)
sec. 26.54; Mfertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, 1939 Supplement,
sec. 26.54, for a collection of the legion of cases enunciating this rule.
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for decision, sales between a stockholder and a corporation were
generally held to constitute closed transactions, losses thereon
being subject to disallowance only where lack of bona fides was
shown or where an agreement existed for reacquisition of the
thing sold.' 5 Lack of bona fides, of course, could serve as a
reason for disregarding the separateness of the entity of the
corporation from Smith, its sole stockholder, 6 and it is here that
the concept of entity comes into our discussion.
The "General Rule" and the "Exception" concerning cor-
porate entity in federal income taxation are simply and briefly
phrased. Ordinarily, the distinction between the corporation and
its stockholders will be upheld-the corporate veil is a shield.17
But where to sustain the corporate entity "would present an ob-
stacle to the due protection or enforcement of public or private
right,""' the corporate entity will be disregarded-the veil be-
comes a thing of gossamer, easily slashed by the perceptive sword
of the tax tribunal. 9
15Helvering v. Johnson, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 140,
affirmed by an equally divided Court, (1940) 308 U. S. 523, 60 Sup. Ct.
293, 84 L. Ed. 247; Shoenberg v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935)
77 F. (2d) 446, cert. denied (1936) 296 U. S. 586, 56 Sup. Ct. 101, 80
L. Ed. 414; Commissioner v. Riggs, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d)
1004, cert. denied, (1936) 296 U. S. 637, 56 Sup. Ct. 171, 80 L. Ed. 453;
Commissioner v. Dyer, (1935) 74 F. (2d) 685, cert. denied, (1936) 296
U. S. 586, 56 Sup. Ct. 97, 80 L. Ed. 414; Shelden Land Company, (1940)
42 B. T. A. 498, and cases therein cited.
16Disregard, of course, would mean that no "true" sale, no "identifiable
event," no "closed transaction," took place in the eyes of the law, for if
Smith "were" Innisfail Corporation, how could he be said to "sell" any-
thing to himself, etc.?
1"Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64
L. Ed. 521, [The author must herein beg his own pardon, but nevertheless
Mr. Justice Pitney did hold that Mrs. Macomber had a life of her own,
legally distinct from that of the Standard Oil Company of California];
Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, (1930) 282 U. S. 19, 51 Sup. Ct.
15, 75 L. Ed. 140 [Kentucky tax on stockholders of corporations, less than
75 per cent of the property of which was subject to the state's tax juris-
diction]; Dalton v. Bowers, (1932) 287 U. S. 404, 53 Sup. Ct. 205, 77 L.
Ed. 389; Burnet v. Clark, (1932) 287 U. S. 410, 53 Sup. Ct. 207, 77 L.
Ed. 397; Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., (1932) 287 U. S.
415, 53 Sup. Ct. 198, 77 L. Ed. 399; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
(1934) 292 U. S. 435, 54 Sup. Ct. 788, 78 L. Ed. 1348.
'
8 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, (1934) 292 U. S. 435, 54 Sup.
Ct. 788, 78 L. Ed. 1348.
19United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 257, 31
Sup. Ct. 387, 55 L. Ed. 458; Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, (1918) 247
U. S. 330, 38 Sup. Ct. 540, 62 L. Ed. 1142; Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, (1918) 247 U. S.
490, 38 Sup. Ct. 553, 62 L. Ed. 1229 [not a tax case] ; Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion v. Lewellyn, (1918) 248 U. S. 71, 39 Sup. Ct. 35, 63 L. Ed. 133. There
is naturally a multitude of lower-court and board decisions on corporate
entity, some of which will be discussed below. But this and note 17 give
the clear-cut rule and the exception well enough.
ENTITY IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
In this state of the law, the decision of Higgins v. Smith came
as a surprise. The district court for the southern district of New
York had given a charge to the jury which, not having been
published, had passed generally unnoticed. The jury had been
directed to consider whether the sales by Smith to his corpora-
tion were tranfers "out of Mr. Smith and into something that
existed separate and apart from him," or whether there had been
"a transfer by Mr. Smith's left hand, being his individual hand,
into his right hand, being his corporate hand, so that in truth
and fact there was no transfer at all." The jury found that Smith
had, in fact, been playing catch with himself. On appeal, the
judgment was reversed and the case remanded. The second
circuit, per Chase, J., adhered to the general rule we have above
described and in addition relied on certain other circuit decisions.2 0
In writing for the majority and in reversing the court below,
Mr. Justice Reed was forthright and clear. He found the domina-
tion and control exercised by Smith over Innisfail Corporation
to be "so obvious . . . as to require a peremptory instruction
that no loss in the statutory sense could occur upon a sale by a
taxpayer to such an entity." Burnet v. Commonwealth Improve-
ment Co.- did not aid Smith in any sense, for if a taxpayer in-
corporates his affairs "he must accept the tax disadvantages.
22
The following language was destined to be cited in innumer-
able briefs subsequently filed on behalf of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue:
". .. the government may not be required to acquiesce in the
taxpayer's election of that form for doing business which is
most advantageous to him. The government may look at actu-
alities and upon determination that the form employed for doing
business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or
a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best
serve the purposes of the tax statute. To hold otherwise would
permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede legislation in the
2oparticularly on Jones v. Helvering, (1934) 63 App. D. C. 204, 71
F. (2d) 214; Commissioner v. Eldridge, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1935) 79 F.
(2d) 629; Commissioner v. MIcCreery, 83 F. (2d) 817, (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1936) and Foster v. Commissioner (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 130.
The Supreme Court in the course of its opinion did not expressly overrule
any of these. It would thus appear that only history will show whether
they are no longer good law. See Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent at 308 U. S.
480.
-1(1932) 287 U. S. 415, 53 Sup. Ct. 193, 77 L. Ed. 399.2 In the Commonwealth Improvement Co. Case, the taxpayer corpora-
tion, by filing separate returns, had enabled the estate of its sole stock-
holder to enjoy tax advantages in years prior to the taxable year there
under consideration. An appeal for disregard of corporate entity was
denied, the facts controlling the situation to a marked degree.
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determination of the time and manner of taxation. It is com-
mand of income and its benefits which marks the real owner of
property."2 3
At first seeming, this is verbiage of bitter import to the man
in the barrel. A hasty reading leaves the impression that the
Treasury may play fast and loose with legal entities, whenever
its adding machines and comptometers tell it that the revenues will
thereby wax greater. But it is here that study must begin, and
here that the purpose of this paper will be discharged.
The first thing to be noted is in the above-quoted paragraph:
"Upon determination that the form employed for doing business
or carrying out the challenged tax event is uireal or a sham.
24
The primary effect of this is to cast upon the taxpayer the bur-
den of proving the reality and the practical business necessity
of the scheme by which he has ordered his affairs. He has always
had the burden of proving his freedom from tax liability any-
way,25 and he cannot justly complain at having to obey this be-
hest once again. Over-ingenious schemes for reducing taxes
have, moreover, throughout the history of the Revenue Acts,
earned the disapproval and even the lash of courts.28  Hence, no
taxpayer should feel aggrieved at having to demonstrate the fiscal
purity of his conduct. Nor, per contra, may the Treasury ar-
bitrarily rule, and be upheld in ruling, that the United States
23Lucas v. Earl, (1930) 281 U. S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct. 241, 74 L. Ed. 731;
Corliss v. Bowers, (1930) 281 U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916;
Griffiths v. Commissioner, (1939) 308 U. S. 355, 60 Sup. Ct. 277, 84 L. Ed.
238. Refinements of title are not always as scorned as this. See cases below,
notes 28 and 36; Senior v. Braden, (1935) 295 U. S. 422, 55 Sup. Ct. 800,
79 L. Ed. 1520.
24Italics added.25Board of Tax Appeals, Rules of Practice, (15th ed. 1940) Rule 32;
Wisconsin Butter & Cheese Co., (1928) 10 B. T. A. 852; American Felt
Co., (1929) 18 B. T. A. 504; affirmed on other grounds sub. nom.
American Felt Co. v. Burnet, (1932) 61 App. D. C. 125, 58 F. (2d) 530.
In suits for refund in the United States district courts, the plaintiff-
taxpayer, as is well-known, carries the burden of proving his case. See
9 Wigmore, Evidence (1940) secs. 2485, 2486. The burden of proof is
cast upon the government in certain instances, such as fraud (Internal
Revenue Code see. 1112), or where the government has pleaded new
matter in its answer, (John 0. Fowler, (1939) 40 B.T.A. 1292 (on appeal,
C.C.A. 2nd Cir.)
26Gregory v. Helvering, (1935) 293 U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 79
L. Ed. 596, and Helvering v. Mitchell, (1938) 303 U. S. 391, 58 Sup. Ct.
630, 82 L. Ed. 917, come most readily to mind as examples. There was no
fraud involved in Higgins v. Smith, and that taxpayer has been absolved
thereof in respect of similar transactions for other years in John Thomas
Smith, (1940) 42 B. T. A. 505 and (1939) 40 B. T. A. 387. See note 9.
The real surprise in Higgins v. Smith is its holding that sales between an
individual and the corporation of which he owns all the capital stock are,
as a matter of law, sham and unreal.
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Steel Corporation is sham and unreal or that sales of stock be-
tween it and one of its small stockholders are without tax con-
sequences.
The second point for emphasis lies in other portions of the
opinion and serves to indicate the scope of the fiction of corporate
entity.
"It is clear," said Mr. Justice Reed, "an actual corporation
existed. . . .But the existence of an actual corporation is only
one incident necessary to complete an actual sale to it under the
revenue act. Title, we shall assume, passed to Innisfail but the
taxpayer retained the control."
In other words, a "disregard of corporate entity" in tax law
here goes no further than to disallow the particular tax conse-
quence of a deductible loss. The title to the stock, lumping the
title concept for the moment, passed to the corporation. The lat-
ter alone could vote it, sell it, pledge it, or receive the dividends
thereon. When the Court holds "there is not enough of sub-
stance in such a sale finally to determine a loss," it means that
the loss does not constitute an item deductible from gross in-
come for tax purposes, but it does not mean "there was no sale"
or "there was no corporation." The fiction is tailored to fit the
facts, not to annihilate them.27
27To uphold or to disregard corporate entity is to employ a fiction.
The most pertinent observation in this regard is that of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, (1930) 282 U. S. 19, 51
Sup. Ct. 15, 75 L. Ed. 140: "But it leads nowhere to call a corporation a
fiction. If it is a fiction it is a fiction created by law with intent that it
should be acted on as if true. The corporation is a person and its owner-
ship is a non-conductor that makes it impossible to attribute an interest
in its property to its members." The same judge, in Gulf Oil Corporation
v. Lewellyn, (1918) 248 U. S. 71, 39 Sup. Ct. 35, 63 L. Ed. 133, declared
that the existence of a holding company apart from its subsidiary corpora-
tion was only "bookkeeping" and held that the former was not taxably
in receipt of a dividend from the latter.
The handling of the fiction in two recent cases is interesting. In Mead
Corp. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1940) ...... F. (2d) ...... the court
refused to sanction the commissioner's argument that the entity of the
taxpayer corporation should be sustained but the entity of its sole stock-
holder, a family corporation, disregarded, for the purposes of sec. 104 of the
Revenue Act of 1928. The inconsistency thus suggested was too much
for the court. In Lyon, Inc., (1940) 42 B. T. A. 1094, the taxpayer asked to
have a "mere conduit corporation disregarded under the rule of Gregory
v. Helvering, (1935) 293 U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596 so
that the conclusion might be reached that no tax-free reorganization had
resulted. Citing Higgins v. Smith, (1940) 308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355,
84 L. Ed. 321 the board replied: ". . . in the light of Gregory v. Helvering,
and the record, the acquisition of Lyon's assets by petitioner through the
Lyon Development Company as a mere conduit, may have been, as petitioner
argues, a mere device-a disguise-a fiction-but the government is not
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This limitation on the use of Higgins v. Smith as a precedent
has already been recognized in a decision of the board of tax
appeals. In Otto Peterson,2 8 a corporation, all of whose stock was
held by three individuals who were also its directors, increased
its capital stock and issued the new shares to the wives and fami-
lies of the existing stockholders at a price of $10 per share, which
was duly paid by the purchasers. The stock was worth consider-
ably more than $10 per share, and three days after its issuance
a dividend of $50 per share on all stock of record was declared
and paid. Although the motives of the transaction were to re-
duce surtaxes on the corporation without unduly increasing the
individual taxes of the shareholders, the board found that all
formal requirements of an issuance and sale of stock had been
complied with and refused to tax the three original stockholders
in respect of the dividends declared on the shares of the new
stockholders. The commissioner had relied on Higgins v. Smith
and Helvering v'. Clifford and had urged that no real transfer of
the new stock had taken place. Though remarking that the trans-
action might have been heavily tainted with sham and unreality,
the board held that "the transfer of title to that stock to those
record owners was actual and absolute." The liability for income
tax on the dividends on the new shares attached only to the
new stockholders.
2 9
The last decision of the Supreme Court on entity was He[-
vering v. Clifford, Jr.30 The import of this case for trust com-
compelled to so regard it in the special circumstances before us here. It
may and here does continue to treat this fiction as real."
For the leading philosophical work on the use of fictions in all fields
of thought, see Vaihinger, The Philosonhy of As-If. (translated from the
German original, Die Philosophie des Als Ob), (1924).
28(1940) 42 B. T. A. 102 (Now on appeal to the C.C.A. 6th Cir.)
29In Archibald R. Watson, (1940) 42 B. T. A. 52, the board further
delimited the doctrine of Higgins v. Smith by holding that it did not
disturb the exception to the general rule (see note 17) embodied in North
Jersey Title Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1936) 84 F.
(2d) 898: Moro Realty Holding Corp., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1933) 65 F.
(2d) 1013: Carling Holding Co., (1940) 41 B. T. A. 493 and Mfark A.
Mayer, (1937) 36 B. T. A. 117; namely that where the corporation created
by the taxpayer functions only to hold title to real estate and where the
disregard by the taxpayer of its separate entity in his tax returns has been
consistent, its entity will be disregarded and the individual taxpayer allowed
to deduct taxes paid on the lands owned by it. In the same opinion, the
board held that Watson could not deduct the expenses of two corpora-
tions he had created to publish two magazines, invoking Burnet v. Com-
monwealth Improvement Co., (1932) 287 U. S. 415, 53 Sup. Ct. 198, 77
L. Ed. 399, because their entities must be held to be taxably separate
from Watson. The crucial fact for the Board was that the two cor-
porations had been created by the taxpayer to carry on a business.
• 0(1940) 309 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 504.
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panies and settlors cannot be overemphasized and has been well
treated elsewhere. 31 What we are here concerned with is what
it adds to the doctrine of entity in taxation. Clifford declared
himself trustee of certain securities owned by him for a period
of five years. The net income arising from those assets was to be
paid over to his wife. Upon termination, the trust corpus re-
verted to him and any accumulated income or the proceeds of the
investment of such income went to his wife. Meanwhile Clifford,
as trustee, retained a large number of powers32 to deal with the
trust res-all short of a power to revoke. The holding of the
Court, per Mr. justice Douglas, is well-known. In brief it was
that Clifford had remained the owner of the trusteed securities,
despite his transfer of them to himself as trustee, and that he
must include all the income arising from the trust res in his
personal return and pay a tax thereon.
Clifford "continued to be the owner for purposes of sec. 22
(a)" of the Revenue Act of 1934."8
"In substance his control over the corpus was in all essential
respects the same after the trust as before. . . . As a result of
the terms of the trust and the intimacy of the familial relation-
ship respondent retained the substance of full enjoyment of all
the rights which previously he had in the property."
If he remained the owner of the trusteed stock, it followed
that he had to pay tax on the income arising therefrom.
To reach this conclusion, Mr. justice Douglas had to disre-
31See Ray, (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1322; note, (1940) 53 Harv. L.
Rev. 1050; note (1940) 38 Mfich. L. Rev. 885.
• 
2These retained powers were: to vote the trusteed stock; to sell,
exchange, mortgage or pledge any of the securities comprising the corpus;
to invest cash in the trust estate in loans, secured or unsecured; to collect
all income; to compromise any claims held by him as trustee; and to
hold any property in the trust estate in the names of others or in his own
name. He provided that he should be excused from all losses except those
occasioned by his wilful and deliberate breach of duties as trustee. The
wife was placed under no restrictions as to the use of the income paid over to
her by her husband-trustee, but he reserved the discretion to determine
what amounts she should receive.
33
"Sec. 22. Gross Income.
(a) General Definiion.--"Gross income includes gains, profits, and in-
come derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service,
of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, voca-
tions, trades, businesses, commerce or sales, whether real or personal, grow-
ing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from
interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transactions of any business
carried on for gain or profit, or gains and profits and income derived
from any source whatsoever. . . ." This is the cornerstone of the
Federal Income Tax, next in importance to the sixteenth amendment.
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gard the separate entity of the trust. 4 Otherwise, the trust in-
come would have to be held taxable to Clifford's wife or to him-
self in his capacity as trustee under the Internal Revenue Code,
sections 161 and 162. But if we shift the facts a little, and as-
sume a third-party or corporate trustee, we are prepared again
to note a limitation to the scope of the Clifford doctrine similar
to that of Higgins v. Smith, although the result as to the taxa-
bility of the grantor of such a trust remains the same.35 That
limitation is, that the legal title passes to the trustee and the
beneficial title to the cestui, despite the reading out of the trust,
taxably speaking. The trust does not go up in smoke as a legal
device. It is of no help to the grantor in reducing his income
taxes, but the idea of "no-trust" applies only for the purpose
of determining the liability for the tax on the income arising
from the trust res.
This limitation on the scope of the Supreme Court's doctrine
of entity has likewise been recognized in a recent decision of the
board of tax appeals. In Minnie M. Fay Trusts, 3" the issue be-
fore the board was the proper basis to be used by the trustees
of inter vivos trusts for computing gain on the sale of a portion
of the securities held as corpora. The grantor had created the
trusts prior to his death, and had provided that the income
should be paid to his wife and that the power to revoke should
be lodged in a committee of three persons, the interests of twro
of whom were non-adverse to the grantor.3 7 He bad also re-
tained a possibility of reverter,3 s and enough powers to render
the application of sec. 22 (a) likely had that issue been before
the board.3 9 Section 113 (a)(3) of the Revenue Acts of 1934
34This is one of the themes elaborated in Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent,
which cites the states which recognize a trust for tax purposes and define
the tax consequences of its creation. See also Higgins v. White, (C.C.A.
1st Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 357.
-
5George H. Deuble, (1940) 42 B. T. A. 277; Herbert W. Hoover,(1940) 42 B. T. A. 289; Purdon Smith Whiteley, (1940) 42 B. T. A.
316; Frank G. Hoover, (1940) 42 B. T. A. 786. These cases all follow the
Clifford decision and hold that the respective taxpayers remained in sub-
stance the owners of the corpora of the trusts they created, by reason of
their retained powers of control. All of the trustees were trust companies.
36(1940) 42 B. T. A. 765.
37This, of course would have made the grantor taxable on the income
under sections 166 of the Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936 (Internal Revenue
Code, sec. 166).38This would have required the inclusion of the corpora of the trusts
in the grantor's gross estate. Helvering v. Hallock, (1940) 309 U. S.
106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 382.
39The Board assumed the applicability of sec. 22 (a) arguendo.
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and 1936, under which the case arose, provided that the basis
should be the cost to the grantor. Section 113 (a) (5) of the
same acts created an exception: if there was reserved to the
grantor a power to revoke, the basis should be the fair market
value of the trusteed property at the date of his death. The re-
spondent relied on the Clifford Case and argued that sec. 113
(a) (5) applied because it obviously referred to instances where
real control was reserved by settlors.
The board, in holding sec. 113 (a) (5) inapplicable since a
power to revoke had not been reserved to the grantor but only
to a non-adverse interest, said this: "None of the above-mentioned
income and estate tax principles" contradict the juristic transfer
of title from the grantor to the trustees." Hence, the tax liabili-
ties of the grantor or his testamentary estate were not germane
to the issue, which was the cost basis to be employed by the
inter vivos trustees. The basis, held the Board, was dictated by
sec. 113 (a)(3).
It remains to be noted that the problem for taxpayers created
by Higgins v. Smith has been removed, albeit unfavorably to them,
by sec. 24 (a) (6) of the Revenue Act of 1934, as amended by
sec. 301 of the Revenue Act of 1937.41 The provision in its pres-
ent form disallows losses from sales or exchanges of property,
directly or indirectly4 2 betveen (1) members of a family, (2)
between an individual and a corporation if more than fifty per
cent in value of its outstanding stock is owned by or for such
individual (except in the case of liquidating distributions) ,4 3 (3)
between foreign or domestic personal holding companies (except
liquidating distributions) if more than fifty percent of the stock
of each is owned by or for the same individual, (4) between the
grantor and the fiduciary of any trust, (5) between fiduciaries
of trusts with a common grantor, and (6) between a fiduciary
and a beneficiary of a trust. Careful definitions of "stock owner-
ship," "family" and "constructive ownership" are appended.
-
0See notes 36, 37 and 38.41 Internal Revenue Code, sec. 24 (b), now contains the statute, as
amended.
42The Board has construed this phrase in Shelden Land Co., (1940) 42
B. T. A. 493 and declared it to be sufficiently ambiguous to permit of a
resort to the legislative history of the section. Section 24 (a) (6) is also
construed by way of dictum, in Higgins v. Smith, (1940) 308 U. S. 473, 60
Sup. Ct. 355, 84 L. Ed. 321. For the legislative history of these statutes, see
Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws (1938) 316,
317, 198, 199.
43Liquidating distributions are governed by Internal Revenue Code,
sec. 115.
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But meanwhile, Higgins v. Smith and Helvering v. Clifford
will continue as "all things to all men" until they are defined and
limited by subsequent cases. It is the hope of the writer that he
has indicated certain methods of analysis whereby these authori-
ties may be more usefully applied and distinguished. It is one
thing to have a leading case. It is another to have to distinguish
it constantly, keep it in its proper channel, and have it disturb
one's dreams.
